BGP Best Current Practices

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


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BGP Videos

- NSRC has made a video recording of this presentation, as part of a library of BGP videos for the whole community to use:
 - <u>https://learn.nsrc.org/bgp#bgp_best_practices</u>



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BGP Best Current Practices

- Review of recommendations to ensure the BGP is:
 - Configured optimally
 - Operating optimally
 - Configured securely
 - Operating securely





BGP versus OSPF/IS-IS

- OSPF/IS-IS are used to carry infrastructure reachability prefixes only (Loopbacks, internal point-to-points)
- BGP is used internally (IBGP) and externally (EBGP)
- IBGP is used to carry:
 - Some/all Internet prefixes across backbone
 - Customer prefixes
- EBGP is used to:
 - Exchange prefixes with other ASes
 - Implement routing policy





EBGP Default Behaviour

- Industry standard is described in RFC8212
 - <u>https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8212</u>
 - External BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behaviour without Policies
- Configuring EBGP peering without using filters means:
 - All best paths on the local router are passed to the neighbour
 - All routes announced by the neighbour are received by the local router
 - Can have disastrous consequences (see RFC8212)








EBGP Default Behaviour

- FRR turns on RFC8212 support by default:
 - https://frrouting.org/

```
frr.pfs.lab(config)# router bgp 64512 view LAB
frr.pfs.lab(config-router)# bgp ?
<snip>
ebgp-requires-policy Require in and out policy for eBGP peers (RFC8212)
<snip>
```

• Recent Cisco IOS-XE (17.3(?) onwards) has the option:







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Aggregation

- Aggregation means announcing the address block received from the RIR to the other ASes connected to your network
- Subprefixes of this aggregate may be:
 - Used internally in the ISP network
 - Announced to other ASes to aid with multihoming
- Too many operators are still thinking about "class Cs", resulting in a proliferation of /24s in the Internet routing table
 - July 2021: 498652 /24s in IPv4 table of 856599 prefixes
- The same is happening for /48s with IPv6
 - July 2021: 57275 /48s in IPv6 table of 124867 prefixes

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In Sri Lanka

- Deaggregation happening here too
 - Top 5 prefix announcements

Sri Lanka Aggregation Savings Summary					
ASN	No of Nets	Savings	Description		
9329	122	107	SLTINT-AS-AP Sri Lanka Telecom Internet, LK		
5087	82	77	LANKA-COM Lanka Communication Services, LK		
45224	60	57	BELLNET-AS-AP Lanka Bell Limited, LK		
18001	68	55	DIALOG-AS Dialog Axiata PLC., LK		
132045	52	47	AIRTEL-AS-ISP Bharti Airtel Lanka Pvt. Limited,		

- Significant savings possible for each





Receiving Prefixes

- There are three scenarios for receiving prefixes from other ASes
 - Customer talking BGP
 - Peer talking BGP
 - Upstream/Transit talking BGP
- Each has different filtering requirements and need to be considered separately





Receiving Prefixes: From Customers

- ISPs should only accept prefixes which have been assigned or allocated to their downstream customer
- If ISP has assigned address space to its customer, then the customer IS entitled to announce it back to his ISP
- If the ISP has NOT assigned address space to its customer, then:
 - Check in the five RIR databases to see if this address space really has been assigned to the customer
 - The tool: whois –h jwhois.apnic.net x.x.x.0/24
 - (jwhois is "joint whois" and queries all RIR databases)





Receiving Prefixes: From Peers

- A peer is an operator with whom you agree to exchange prefixes each originates into the Internet routing table
 - Prefixes you accept from a peer are only those they have indicated they will announce
 - Prefixes you announce to your peer are only those you have indicated you will announce
- Agreeing what each will announce to the other:
 - Exchange of e-mail documentation as part of the peering agreement, and then ongoing updates

OR

- Use of the Internet Routing Registry and configuration tools such as:
 - IRRToolSet: https://github.com/irrtoolset/irrtoolset
 - bgpq3: <u>https://github.com/snar/bgpq3</u>





Receiving Prefixes: From Transit Providers

- Transit Provider is an operator who you pay to give you transit to the WHOLE Internet
- Receiving prefixes from them is not desirable unless for Traffic Engineering
- Ask transit provider to either:
 - Originate a default-route

OR

 Send full table (including default) so you can discard what is not needed for traffic engineering





Receiving Prefixes

- If it is necessary to receive prefixes from any provider, care is required:
 - Don't accept default (unless you need it)
 - Don't accept your own prefixes
- Be careful with special use prefixes for IPv4 and IPv6:
 - <u>http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6890.txt</u>
- Don't accept IPv4 prefixes longer than /24 (historical Class-C)
- Don't accept IPv6 prefixes longer than /48 (minimum for an end-site)
- Don't accept unassigned prefixes:
 - Team Cymru's list of "bogons" & Bogon Route Server
 - http://www.team-cymru.com/bogon-reference.html





The Peering Database

- The Peering Database documents
 ISPs peering policies
 - https://www.peeringdb.com
- All AS operators are recommended to register in the PeeringDB
 - All operators who are considering peering or are peering must be in the PeeringDB to enhance their peering opportunities

	gDB Advanced Search			
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R as-set/route-set 😗	AS-FACEBOOK	32934 AMS-IX	2001:7f8:1::a503:2934:1 80.249.209.164	0 200G
	AS-FACEBOOK	32934	2001:7f8:1::a503:2934:2	0
ite Server URL		AMS-IX	80.249.212.174	200G
king Glass URL		32934	2001:7f8:1::a503:2934:3	0
- work Type	Content	AMS-IX	80.249.212.175	200G
4 Prefixes 😯	100	32934	2001:7f8:1::a503:2934:4	0
	100	AMS-IX Mumbai 32934	223.31.200.11 2001:e48:44:100b:0:a50	30G ()
6 Prefixes 🕄		32334	3:2934:1	0
ffic Levels	100+Tbps	AMS-IX Mumbai	223.31.200.12	30G
ffic Ratios	Heavy Outbound	32934	2001:e48:44:100b:0:a50 3:2934:2	0
ographic Scope	Global	Any2Denver	206.51.46.106	30G
tocols Supported	⊘ Unicast IPv4 ○ Multicast ⊘ IPv6 ○ Never via route	32934	2605:6c00:303:303::106	0
	servers 🛛	Any2Denver	206.51.46.105	30G
t Updated	2021-04-22T16:08:41Z	32934	2605:6c00:303:303::105 206.72.210.161	0 100G
lic Peering Info Updated	2021-07-09T00:12:56	Any2West 32934	2001:504:13::210:161	0
ering Facility Info	2021-05-20T23:35:20	Any2West	206.72.211.15	100G
dated	2021-03-20123.33.20	32934	2001:504:13::211:15	0
ntact Info Updated	2021-04-13T13:36:10	Asteroid Mombasa	196.60.66.15	10G
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tiple Locations	Not Required	AT TOKYO (CC1/CC2)	Japan	
io Requirement	No	32934	Tokyo	
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ntract Requirement	Not Required	Bharti Airtel Santhome	India	
		32934	Chennai	





Internet Routing Registry

- Many major transit providers and several content providers pay attention to what is contained in the Internet Routing Registry
 - There are many IRR instances operating, the most commonly used being those hosted by the Regional Internet Registries, RADB, and some transit providers
- Best practice for any AS holder is to document their routing policy in the IRR
 - A route-object is the absolute minimum requirement
- Some network operators now using RPKI and ROAs to securely indicate the origin AS of their routes
 - Takes priority over IRR entries
 - IRR contains a lot of outdated (unmaintained) information





Internet Routing Registry

- Which IRR database to use?
 - Members of a Regional Internet Registry are recommended to use their RIR's Internet Routing Registry instance
 - Usually managed via the RIR's member portal giving easy access for creation and update of objects
 - Provided as part of the RIR's services to its members
 - Operators who do not belong to any RIR generally use:
 - Their upstream transit provider's Routing Registry (if provided)
 - The RADB
 - https://www.radb.net
 - Note: Placing objects in the RADB requires an annual subscription fee





Route Origin Authorisation

- Essential first step to secure the global routing system
- Answers this question:
 - How do we know that an AS is permitted to originate the prefix it is originating?
- Uses Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
- Prevents route hijacking and mis-origination
- ROAs signed by RIR members via member portal
 - Digital object containing address prefixes and AS number
- Allows routers to validate prefix announcements received from EBGP peers
 - Drop *invalid*, accept *valid*, low priority for those with no ROA
- More details
 - http://www.bgp4all.com/pfs/_media/workshops/02-rpki.pdf

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Configuration Tips

Of passwords, tricks and templates





IBGP: Next-hop-self

- BGP speaker announces external network to IBGP peers using router's local address (loopback) as next-hop
- Used by many ISPs on edge routers
 - Preferable to carrying DMZ point-to-point link addresses in the IGP
 - Reduces size of IGP to just core infrastructure
 - Alternative to using unnumbered interfaces
 - Helps scale network
 - Many ISPs consider this "best practice"





BGP Community Behaviour

IBGP

- Propagate communities to all IBGP speaking routers
 - Be aware: some vendors have this turned off by default
- Use communities for internal BGP scaling
 - Tagging services and destinations
- EBGP
 - Only send communities to influence your BGP peer's policies
 - Don't just send all communities you have
 - Don't send those you've learned from other operators
 - Only accept communities that you need to influence your BGP policies
 - Otherwise remove/overwrite

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Vendor Community Policy implementation

- Be aware that each vendor has differing policy language behaviours for:
 - Treatment of well known communities
 - Setting communities
 - Removing communities
 - Replacing communities
- Consult:
 - Vendor documentation
 - <u>https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8651.txt</u> for discussion of some of the issues operators need to be aware of



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Limiting AS Path Length

- Some announcements have ridiculous lengths of AS-paths
 - This example is an error in one IPv6 implementation

*> 3FFE:1600::/24 22 11537 145 12199 10318 10566 13193 1930 2200 3425 293 5609 5430
13285 6939 14277 1849 33 15589 25336 6830 8002 2042 7610 i

- This example shows 100 prepends (for no obvious reason)

*>i193.105.15.0 2516 3257 50404

 If your implementation supports it, consider limiting the maximum AS-path length you will accept





Private-AS – Removal

- Private, Documentation, and Unassigned ASNs MUST be removed from all announcements to the public Internet
 - Include configuration to remove these ASNs in the EBGP template
- As with private, reserved and unassigned address space, these ASNs must not be leaked to or used on the public Internet

ASN:	Usage:
0 and 65535	(reserved)
64496-64511	(documentation – RFC5398)
64512-65534	(private use only)
23456	(represent 32-bit range in 16-bit world)
65536-65551	(documentation – RFC5398)
420000000-4294967295	(private use only)



BGP Maximum Prefix Tracking

- Allow configuration of the maximum number of prefixes a BGP router will receive from a peer
 - If you expect N prefixes, set the "maximum prefixes" to be 2xN
 - Then router will warn/tear down BGP session if the limit is exceeded
 - If you are receiving the full BGP table, it is still a good idea to set a limit
 - Prevents against major accidental leaks
 - Cisco IOS CLI example:

neighbor <x.x.x.x> maximum-prefix <max> [restart N] [<threshold>] [warning-only]






BGP TTL "hack"

- Implement RFC5082 on EBGP peerings
 - (Generalised TTL Security Mechanism)
 - Neighbour sets TTL to 255
 - Local router expects TTL of incoming BGP packets to be 254
 - Nothing apart from directly attached devices can send BGP packets which arrive with TTL of 254, so any possible attack by a remote miscreant is dropped due to TTL mismatch

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Templates

- Good practice to configure templates for everything
 - Vendor defaults tend not to be optimal or even very useful for ISPs
 - ISPs create their own defaults by using configuration templates
- EBGP and IBGP examples in following slides
 - Also see Team Cymru's BGP templates
 - <u>http://www.team-cymru.com/community-services.html</u>





IBGP Template Example (1)

- IBGP between loopbacks!
- Next-hop-self
 - Keep DMZ and external point-to-point out of IGP
- Always send communities in IBGP
 - Otherwise BGP policy accidents will happen
 - (Default on some vendor implementations, optional on others)
- Hardwire BGP to version 4
 - Prevents accidental configuration of BGP version 3 which is still supported in some implementations





IBGP Template Example (2)

- Use passwords on IBGP session
 - Not being paranoid, VERY necessary
 - It's a secret shared between you and your peer
 - If arriving packets don't have the correct MD5 hash, they are ignored
 - Helps defeat miscreants who wish to attack BGP sessions
- Powerful preventative tool, especially when combined with filters and the TTL "hack"





EBGP Template Example (1)

- BGP damping
 - Do NOT use it unless you understand the impact
 - Do NOT use the vendor defaults without thinking
- Remove private/unassigned ASNs from announcements
 - Common omission today
- Adhere to RFC8212
 - Make sure there is inbound and outbound filtering applied to all EBGP sessions!
- Use password agreed between you and peer on EBGP session





EBGP Template Example (2)

- Use maximum-prefix tracking
 - Router will warn you if there are sudden increases in BGP table size, bringing down EBGP if desired
- Limit maximum as-path length inbound
- Log changes of neighbour state
 - …and monitor those logs!
- Make BGP admin distance higher than that of any IGP
 - Otherwise, prefixes heard from outside your network could override your IGP!!







Routing Security

- Implement the recommendations in https://www.manrs.org
 - Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
 - Filter BGP peers, in & out!
 - Prevent traffic with spoofed source addresses
 - BCP38 Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
 - Facilitate communication between network operators
 - NOC to NOC Communication
 - Up-to-date details in Route and AS Objects, and PeeringDB
 - Facilitate validation of routing information
 - Route Origin Authorisation using RPKI







Questions?



